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Recent Developments
MARYLAND DECISIONS AND STATUTES
Holtman v. State1

A Church Is Not A Dwelling House
The defendant broke into churches in the daytime, ransacked one of
them looking for money, left, and was soon apprehended. He was
charged and convicted, inter alia, of daytime housebreaking (Statutory
Burglary).
The court of special appeals reversed the conviction citing Sizemore
v. State, 10 Md. App. 682, 689, 272 A. 2d 824, 827 (1971):
One who breaks a church in the day or night with intent to
commit murder or felony therein, or with intent to steal goods
of the value of $100.00 or more is guilty of the storehouse
breaking proscribed by Code, Art. 27, § 32 .... But a person
who breaks a church is not guilty of the statutory burglary
proscribed by Art. 27, § 30(a) or the crime proscribed by §
30(b), because a necessary element of those offenses is that it
be a dwelling house that be broken and a church is not a
dwelling house.
At common law it was burglary to break and enter a church with
felonious intent. 2 As recently as 1964, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that breaking and entering a church at night to remove a
3
safe therefrom constituted common-law burglary.
Brooks v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 4
Appeal While Third Party Action Pending
The defendant purchased an automobile from a dealer who assigned
the contract to a credit company. When the defendant stopped making
payments, the credit company sued on the contract and the defendant
impleaded the dealer. The plaintiff credit company obtained a
1

12 Md. App. 168, 278 A. 2d 82 (1971).

2 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES, §13.01 (7th ed.).

3 McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A. 2d 229 (1964).
4 261 Md 278, 274 A. 2d 345 (1971).
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summary judgment from which defendant appealed.
In this case, the court of appeals noted the interesting question:
May a defendant in an action in which he is also a third-party
plaintiff, appeal from a judgment5 entered against him while the
third-party claim is still pending?
The court stated:
We have consistently held that appeals will lie only from final
judgments
which settle the rights of the parties or conclude the
6
cause.
When the defendant impleaded the dealer, he could not separate the
original claim from the third-party claim for purposes of appeal
without complying with the provisions of Maryland Rules or Procedure
605a:
Where more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any7 time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims.
The court concluded:
In the case before us, the trial court made no express
determination that there was no just reason for delay and left
open the third-party claim. The appeal must be dismissed as
prematurely taken, since without a certification under Rule
605a, the judgment remained interlocutory.8

Jeter v. State 9
Principal In Second-Degree Convicted Wben PrincipalIn First-Degree
Acquitted
The trial judge found the defendant, a principal in the second-degree,
guilty of murder in the first degree. From this conviction and an

5 261 Md. at

280, 274 A. 2d at 346.
6Id.
7 261 Md. at 281, 274 A. 2dat 346-47.
8 261 Md. at 282, 274 A. 2d at 347.
9 261 Md. 221, 274 A. 2d 337 (1971).
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accompanying sentence of life imprisonment, the defendant appealed
to the court of special appeals, which affirmed the judgment. While the
appeal was pending, the defendant's co-defendant, the alleged triggerman and principal in the first degree, was acquitted of any unlawful
homicide in a separate jury trial. The court of special appeals was made
aware of this development but concluded it had no effect on the
defendant's conviction. The court of appeals granted certiorari and
concluded:
... the Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding that the
subsequent acquittal of a principal in the first degree does not
affect the trial or conviction of a principal in the second degree.
We believe the Court's analysis of the applicable law, set both in
Jeter v. State, supra at 582, is sound andin accordance with the
almost unanimous opinion of the authorities as enunciated by
the courts of other jurisdictions and the criminal law treatises.1 0

Melvin Jones v. State of Maryland 1 1
Due Process v. Gags and Shackles
Just before the commencement of appellant's trial, the trial judge
was passing the entrance of the court-room and observed therein the
appellant involved in some sort of altercation with four deputy sheriffs.
The judge then ordered the deputies to shackle and gag the appellant.
The appellant remained in this condition during much of the trial and
was subsequently convicted of rape and assault and sentenced to fifty
years imprisonment. On appeal, he contends, inter alia, that his
appearances before the jury, shackled and gagged, denied him a fair and
impartial trial.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction and
remanded it back to the trial court, 11 Md. App. 686, 276 A. 2d. 666
1
(1971), citing the holding of the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen: 2
[W] e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to
be present at trial (or, presumably, to remain unshackled and
ungagged) if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will
be removed (or shackled or gagged) if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting
himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectfully of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him
in the courtroom (or, presumably, unshackled and ungagged).
10 261 Md. at 223-24, 274 A. 2d at 338.

11 11 Md. App. 686, 276 A. 2d 666 (1971).
12 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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Once lost, the right to be present (or be unshackled and
ungagged) can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant
is wiing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and
respect
inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceed1
ings. 3
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals went on to say:
...we think the proper procedure requires that the trial court
not act overtly in mere anticipation of trouble .... If, after full
and explicit warnings have been given, a defendant nevertheless,
persists in disruptive conduct, it would then be appropriate for
the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, to employ such
Allen type sanctions deemed by him to be absolutely necessary
for the trial to proceed in an orderly fashion.' 4
Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that appellant
was unconstitutionally denied the "due process of law"
guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Is

1311 Md. App. at 692, 276 A. 2d at 669-70.
14 11 Md. App. at 693-94, 276 A. 2d at 670.
' 5 11 Md. App. at 693, 276 A. 2d at 670.
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SENATE BILL 454-PUBLIC DEFENDER'
The Maryland Legislature created a Public Defender System and
authorized its operation to begin January 1, 1972. The head of the office
will be called the Public Defender, who will be appointed by the Board of
Trustees, who are in turn appointed by the Governor. The Public
Defender, with the approval of the Board of Trustees, will appoint a
Deputy Public Defender, and one (1) District Public Defender for each
court district. The Public Defender, with advice of the District Public
Defenders, will also appoint Assistant District Public Defenders as
authorized by the budget. All of the Defenders will be salaried and except
for the Public Defender, may engage in private practice, not involving
criminal law. Each District Public Defender will maintain a confidential
list of private attorneys-at-law, called "Panel Attorneys," who will be
available to serve as counsel to indigent persons eligible for legal
representation by the Public Defender System. Maximum use of panel
attorneys is emphasized and they will be compensated by the Office of
the Public Defender.
Legal representation is to be provided indigent defendants in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding constitutionally requiring the presence
of counsel prior to presentment before a commissioner or judge, or any
state criminal or juvenile proceedings involving an offense, the penalty
for which involves the possibility of confinement for more than three
(3) months or a fine of more than five-hundred ($500.00) dollars. In
addition, representation will be provided in proceedings under the
Defective Delinquent laws, post-conviction proceedings, and any
criminal offense, where in the opinion of the court, the accused may
require representation by counsel. The Public Defenders Officer may
also represent an indigent person in a federal court of the United States
at federal expense, if the matter arises out of or is related to an action
pending or recently pending in a court of criminal jurisdiction in
Maryland.
2
HOUSE BILL 298-RENT ESCROW

Baltimore City's Rent Escrow Law underwent needed substantive
changes this past legislative session. This new law gives the tenant a
I MD.

ANN. CODE art. 27A; ch. 209, 119711 Md. Laws 485.

2 Ch. 687, [19711 Md. Laws, 1467. Repeals § § 9-9 and 9-10 of CODE OF PUBLIC
LOCAL LAWS OF BALTIMORE CITY.
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little more protection and gives the court additional authority in the
disposition and control of escrow funds. A tenant may now initiate
action when serious defects exist. The old law could only be used by
the tenant as a defense to a landlord's action in a summons in
ejectment. The court can now award all moneys accumulated in escrow
to the tenant if the landlord does not remedy the conditions in
violation within six months. The court also has explicit authority to
order payment of funds in escrow for the purpose of making repairs..
The retaliatory eviction protectives have been extended to those who
do not initiate rent escrow procedures but merely complain to any
3
governmental agency.
SENATE BILL 653-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
4
HABITABILITY FOR BALTIMORE CITY
The new section 9-14.1 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City, creates a warranty by landlords to rent property that is
habitable, that is, free from health, safety and fire hazards. This
warranty is implied in any written or oral lease agreement for rental of
a dwelling intended for human habitation and cannot be waived.
Conditions in violation of the warranty include, but are not limited
to vermin or rodent infestation, lack of heat, lack of running water, or
lack of electricity.
The legislative intent is to protect the tenant who does not want to
invoke the provisions of the Rent Escrow Law, but wants to move
immediately and be assured of the return of the rental payments and
deposit, as well as moving costs.
A notice to the landlord of a violation existing on the premises is a
condition precedent to any action or proceeding for breach of the
warranty. This notice requirement can be fulfilled either by a violation
notice from the Department of Housing and Community.Development
or other municipal agency or by certified letter from the tenant.
Damages for breach of this warranty are ordinary contract damages.
Although generally favorable to the tenant, this Bill leaves the
landlord adequately protected. The warranty is effective for only
Thirty (30) days after the beginning of the lease agreement. Where the
tenant has in bad faith refused entry to the landlord for the purpose of
correcting the conditions, the court may impose upon the tenant, the
cost of the landlord's defense. Where the tenant has himself caused the
conditions to exist, the court shall impose upon the tenant the cost of
repair.
3 Art. 4 of the CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS OF MD. (1969 Ed.).
4 Ch. 481, [1971] Md. Laws 1052.
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SENATE BILL 4215
The Maryland Civil Commitment Law, in need of a major overhaul,
received only a minor tune-up by the past legislative session. The most
controversial portion of the existing law was left substantively
unchanged; i.e., indefinite involuntary commitment with the certification of two physicians. However, there are significant improvements in
the area of "emergency admission" and "patients' rights" as a result of
repeal, amendment and re-enactment of various sections of Article 59
of the Annotated Code of Maryland. A petition for emergency
admission must first be examined and the petitioner questioned by a
judge to determine if probable cause exists to take the individual into
custody and transfer him to a medical facility. If the petitioner is a
physician or peace officer, they must do the same within twenty-four
(24) hours after a person is taken into custody and so transported. The
petition must be filed under oath, certifying that the petitioner has
reason to believe that the potential admittee is suffering from a mental
disorder and is in clear and imminent danger of causing grave and
immediate personal injury to himself and others. Detention under this
law is for a period of no longer than ninety-six (96) hours and the
admittee must be examined within six hours after his admission to a
medical facility.
To aid patients admitted pursuant to Article 59, a Mental Health
Review and Information Service has been created. In addition to
providing information to patients and their relatives with regard to the
legal rights and status of the patient, it is an investigative arm of the
court regarding a person's continued detention or release.
HOUSE BILL 129, CONSUMER PROTECTION
6
IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A new Section 2-316A, added to Article 95 B of the Annotated Code
of Maryland (Uniform Commercial Code), provides that language used
by the seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services to
attempt to modify or include implied or expresses warranties shall be
unenforceable except in the case of express warranties by a manufacturer who provides reasonable and expeditious means of performing
the warranty obligations. Pursuant to this legislation, sellers of

5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § §22, 53, 54, 54A, 55, 56 and 57; ch. 761, §1 [19711 Md.
Laws 1635.
6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B §2-316A;ch. 505, [19711 Md. Laws 1131.
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consumer goods can no longer disclaim, in any sales contract, the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. Such
disclaimers have previously been permitted by statute and enforced by
the courts.
HOUSE BILL 790-UNSOLICITED MERCHANDISE-A GIFT 7
The newly enacted Section 21A of Article 83 of the Annotated Code
of Maryland provides that where an offer for the sale of goods or
merchandise includes the unsolicited sending of any goods or merchandise, the receipt of such shall be deemed an unconditional gift thereto
to the recipient. Also provided in this consumer oriented bill is a
remedy for the recipient of such goods if the sender continues to bill
for them.
BLOCKBUSTING AND THE SENATE
An effort was made in the Senate to cure the unethical real estate
practice of blockbusting, a problem existing throughout Maryland. The
most important bills failed, including Senate Bill 318, which made it
unlawful to knowingly provide financial assitance to one engaged in
blockbusting and Senate Bill 322, which was a model blockbusting
statute that created a private cause of action for blockbusting.
However, positive gains were reflected with the passage of Senate Bill
3128, requiring in land installment contracts, disclosure of all transfers
of title and sale prices of property for six months prior to date of
purchase and Senate Bill 3219, providing that solicitation is unlawful if
a purpose of the solicitation is to change the racial composition of a
neighborhood.

SMI). ANN. CODE, art 83, §21A; ch. 721, [19711 Md. Laws 1550.
AMD. ANN. CODE, art 21, §112(1); ch. 445, 11971], Md. Laws 985.
9 MD. ANN. CODE, art.56, §230B; ch. 71, [19711 Md. Laws 322.

